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I. INTRODUCTION
The basis is straightforward and rather explicit:  if you commit a felony
and cause the death of another in perpetration of the felony, then you are prob-
ably guilty of felony murder.1  Criminal liability is only probable because the
law surrounding felony murder has been subject to numerous legislative and
judicial limitations from its original common law formulation.2  Often defined
as murder “[c]ommitted in the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of one or
more statutorily enumerated felonies,3 courts recognize felony murder as akin
to a strict liability offense because of the lack of any mens rea element in
proving commission of the homicide if the prosecution can establish that the
1 See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule:  A Study of the
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1994) (stating
that felony murder “follows a compellingly simple, almost mathematical, logic:  a felony + a
killing = a murder”).
2 The common law provided that “a person will be held criminally responsible for a death
that occurs ‘in the commission or attempted commission of’ a felony.”  Dana K. Cole,
Expanding Felony-Murder in Ohio:  Felony-Murder or Murder-Felony?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
15, 15 (2002) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 682 (3d. ed. 2000) and MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980)).  For a discussion of the Model Penal Code’s rather
adverse position to felony murder, see, e.g., Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens Rea
Default Rules:  A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399 (2000) [here-
inafter Binder, A Study in Statutory Interpretation].  For examples of limitations engrafted
upon the felony murder doctrine, see, e.g., 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide §§ 67, 70 (2008); 40
C.J.S. Homicide §§ 55–56 (2006); 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 149
(15th ed. 2007).  For an extensive analysis of the background and historical development of
the doctrine, see, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57
STAN. L. REV. 59 (2004) [hereinafter Binder, Origins of Felony Murder]; Leonard Birdsong,
Felony Murder:  A Historical Perspective by which to Understand Today’s Modern Felony
Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2006).
3 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (2007) (“Murder of the first degree is murder
which is: . . . . Committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual assault,
kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, invasion of the home, sexual abuse of a child, sexual
molestation of a child under the age of 14 years, child abuse or abuse of an older person or
vulnerable person. . . . .”).  For a comprehensive list of state murder statutes using the phrase
“in perpetration of” to proscribe felony murder, see Cole, supra note 2, at 16 n.4.
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defendant intended to commit the underlying felony.4  Although critics have
expressed constructive opposition, and even outright hostility, toward the rule,5
the doctrine continues to enjoy widespread acceptance in our society.6
The purpose of this Note is not to analyze, criticize, commend, or compare
and contrast the pros and cons of the felony murder doctrine.  Commentators
and authors past have adequately, and to a certain extent, exhaustively, pro-
vided a thorough analysis for others to comprehend the doctrine and its inherent
underlying complexities from both its early English common law formulation
and adverse rejection by the Model Penal Code, to those interpretations and
views of well-known criminal law scholars such as Wayne R. LaFave, Austin
W. Scott, Francis Wharton, and Joshua Dressler.7  Rather, this Note is limited
to the following inquiry:  whether a state can prosecute a defendant for felony
murder when the circumstances lead a reasonably prudent person to believe
that the defendant committed a felonious act after he committed homicide,
often referred to as murder felony or as an “afterthought” killing.8  State courts
across the United States have split on deciding whether a defendant, who first
commits a homicide, and then commits a felony, nevertheless commits felony
murder in the statutory sense, even though the intent to commit the felony may
have arose after the homicide.9
The underlying basis for this Note rests primarily on the recent decision by
the Nevada Supreme Court in Nay v. State (hereinafter referred to as the “prin-
cipal case”),10 where the court reviewed a felony murder conviction in the con-
text of murder felony.11  As an issue of first impression in Nevada,12 the court
4 See, e.g., Binder, A Study in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 401; Birdsong,
supra note 2, at 2; John S. Huster, Comment, The California Courts Stray from the Felony in
Felony Murder:  What is “In Perpetration” of the Crime?, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 739, 746
(1994); 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 64 (2008); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 51 (2006); see also
Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime:  Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74-75 (1990) (analyzing the notion of strict liability with regard to
felony murder as a running controversy between intent based retributivism and harm based
retributivism).
5 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 17-19; Huster, supra note 4, at 742-43; Nelson E. Roth &
Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule:  A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446-48 (1985); Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 1429-31. But see Cole,
supra note 4, at 73-78; David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony
Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 359-61 (1985); Frederick C. Moesel, Jr.,
Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L. Q. 453, 454-55 (1954).
6 Crump & Crump, supra note 5, at 359.  For a list of state statutes prescribing felony
murder, see 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, CRIMINAL LAWS, CRIMES:  FELONY MURDER
(West 2008).
7 See sources cited supra notes 1–6.  The author of this Note does not intend for the forego-
ing list of names to be exhaustive.
8 See infra Part II.A and cases cited therein.  This Note focuses on the context of murder-
robbery, or “afterthought” robbery, though the author intends for the implications and views
expressed herein to be drawn upon to apply to other circumstances involving murder felony,
including but not limited to in the context of arson, burglary, kidnapping, or other enumer-
ated dangerous felonies as prescribed in a state’s murder statute.
9 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 67 (2008). See also infra Part II.A (discussing the jurisdic-
tions in favor of, and in opposition to, application of the felony murder doctrine under these
particular circumstances).
10 Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430 (Nev. 2007).
11 Id. at 431. See also infra note 16.
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issued its decision in accord with the so-called “majority view,” requiring the
perpetrator to have “intend[ed] to commit the underlying felony at the time the
killing occur[ed].”13  In adopting this rule, the court consequently refused to
permit the State to rest the defendant’s conviction on a felony murder charge
where the evidence suggested that the felony only occurred as an “after-
thought” to the killing.14  The court rejected the so-called “minority view,”
which follows a res gestae approach to the totality of the circumstances:  so
long as the felony and murder are “part and parcel of one continuous action [or
occurrence],” it is irrelevant, for the purposes of conviction, whether the defen-
dant formed the intent to commit the felony prior to committing murder.15  The
court’s decision further exacerbates the interstate conflict between the majority
and minority view, demonstrating a growing need to address the underlying
controversy.16
As a preliminary matter, putting aside for a moment whether the majority
view is really the prevailing or dominant view of jurisdictions across this coun-
try,17 the controversy surrounds the law’s failure to adequately define the scope
of “in perpetration,” or language of similar import,18 in the state statutes pre-
scribing felony murder.19  As a result, states’ highest courts must interpret the
ambiguity inscribed in their respective murder statutes by analyzing the com-
mon law with regard to the felony murder doctrine, any applicable precedential
authority, persuasive authority from other state court decisions, and the general
principles and rationales behind the doctrine as disseminated by scholars and
legal professionals, before deciding how to apply the doctrine in the context of
murder felony.  The author of this Note supports adherence to the minority
view, and therefore, as discussed more fully herein, concludes that the Nevada
Supreme Court erred by adopting the majority view in the principle case.20
12 Nay, 167 P.3d at 433.
13 See id. at 434 (quoting State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. 1999)) and cases
cited therein.
14 Id.
15 See id. at 434–35 and cases cited therein.
16 As this Note proceeded through the publication process, the Nevada Supreme Court
issued a decision in Cortinas v. State, 195 P.3d 315 (Nev. 2008).  In Cortinas, the court
reaffirmed its decision in Nay rejecting the use of “afterthought” robbery to serve as a predi-
cate felony for a felony murder conviction. Id. at 318–19.  To note, the court also reaffirmed
the harmless-error approach implemented relative to reviewing instructional errors, dis-
cussed briefly infra. See id. at 320.
17 See infra Part II.A (breaking down the number of states for and against the minority
view).
18 Similar words or phrases used by different state legislatures include “while,” “during,”
“in commission of,” “in furtherance of,” and “in the course of.”  For a comprehensive list of
state statutes adopting these phrases to proscribe felony murder, see Cole, supra note 2, at 15
n. 2, 16 nn. 3, 5–6.
19 See Huster, supra note 4, at 741.
20 In brief, the Nevada Supreme Court should have adopted the minority view, applied a res
gestae approach to the context of murder felony, and affirmed the defendant’s conviction for
first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon.  Alternatively, the court should have
sustained the defendant’s conviction in light of sufficient circumstantial evidence to corrobo-
rate the prosecution’s case, support the jury’s verdict, and conclude that the district court’s
failure to instruct the jury that the defendant must have had the requisite intent to rob his
victim at the time of, or prior to, the commission of the homicide was harmless error.
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The remainder of this Note is organized into the following sections.  Part
II establishes a contextual framework and historical background for under-
standing the controversy between the majority and the minority views.  Specifi-
cally, Part II presents the following:  (A) an overview of the current21
breakdown of the states in favor of, and opposed to, the minority view; (B) the
concept of, and legal support for, the minority view; (C) the majority view,
including some of its underlying similarities with the minority view and how
state courts supporting the majority view often allow the jury to consider a
charge of felony murder in the context of murder felony based on circumstan-
tial evidence presented by the prosecution to refute an “afterthought” defense;
and (D) pertinent Nevada case and statutory law as relevant to the principal
case, including the elements of the crime for robbery, with particular emphasis
upon the lack of any formal required showing of a defendant’s specific intent to
commit robbery.
Part III addresses, in detail, the facts and circumstances of the principal
case.  Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of both the principal case and the
minority view.  Specifically, Part IV(A) argues that the Nevada Supreme Court
should have adopted the minority view because of the following:  (1) the result-
ing intra-court inconsistency in Nevada by requiring the prosecution to prove
that a defendant had the requisite intent to commit robbery in the context of
felony murder, in accord with the law in Nevada on robbery; (2) the res gestae
approach to felony murder in the context of murder felony is satisfied, corrobo-
rated by the three elements necessary to intimately associate a homicide with
the subsequent felonious act (time, place, and causation);22 and (3) adherence
to the minority view does not render the purposes and rationales behind the
felony murder doctrine superfluous (a major concern for states previously
rejecting the minority view).  Part IV(B) discusses a related, yet distinct con-
cept troubling some state courts and opponents of the minority view:  in light of
another recent decision by the Nevada Supreme Court in McConnell v. State,23
a defendant does not face the possibility of receiving a death sentence upon
conviction of felony murder in the context of murder felony through the use of
the commission of the felony as an aggravating factor; rather, the State must
present evidence of one or more of the other enumerated factors “by which
21 The research for this Note closed in December 2008.
22 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 56 (2006) (“Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the
underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered . . . . [I]n order for a killing to
have been done in the perpetration or attempted perpetration . . . of a particular felony, some
causal connection must exist.”); 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 71 (2007) (“For an unintended
homicide committed in the perpetration of another crime to be culpable . . . the [felonious
act] and the homicide must be integrated and related in a causal way [and] [s]omething more
than a mere coincidence of time and place between the wrongful act and the death is neces-
sary.”) (footnotes omitted); 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 150 (15th
ed. 2007) (“[H]omicide is within the ‘res gestae’ of the felony [if] there was close proximity
in terms of time and distance between the felony and the homicide and there was no break in
the chain of events from the inception of the felony to the time of the homicide.”) (internal
citations omitted).
23 See McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606, 624–25 (Nev. 2004), aff’d 107 P.3d 1287 (Nev.
2005) (forbidding the State to use the same predicate felony for conviction of felony murder
as an aggravating circumstance to invoke the death penalty; instead, the State must introduce
one or more additional aggravators).
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murder of the first degree may be aggravated”24 to warrant imposing the death
sentence.  Part V concludes by suggesting that the court reconsider the substan-
tive merits of the minority view on murder felony and retreat from its current
position favoring the majority view.
II. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Interstate Battle between the Minority and Majority View
Although circumstances giving rise to murder felony are not as common
as those giving rise to felony murder, a number of state courts have had the
opportunity to visit the issue and offer a fair amount of comprehensive and
substantive legal analysis.  By this author’s count, as of December 2008, ten
states favored the minority view (Florida,25 Georgia,26 Illinois,27 Minnesota,28
New Mexico,29 North Carolina,30 Ohio,31 Oklahoma,32 Washington,33 and
Wyoming34) and twelve states, along with the District of Columbia,35 followed
the majority view (Alabama,36 Alaska,37 California,38 Idaho,39 Maryland,40
Massachusetts,41 Missouri,42 Nevada,43 New York,44 Pennsylvania,45 Tennes-
24 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(4) (2007).
25 See, e.g., Leiby v. State, 50 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1951); Taylor v. State, 640 So. 2d 1127 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
26 See, e.g., Francis v. State, 463 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. 1995); Prince v. State, 355 S.E.2d 424
(Ga. 1987); Davis v. State, 340 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. 1986).
27 See, e.g., People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d 252 (Ill. 1992); People v. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d
783 (Ill. 1990).
28 See, e.g., State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1999); State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471
(Minn. 1998).
29 See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 338 P.2d 301 (N.M. 1959).
30 See, e.g., State v. Roseborough, 472 S.E.2d 763 (N.C. 1996); State v. Handy, 419 S.E.2d
545 (N.C. 1992).
31 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 660 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1996); State v. Smith, 574 N.E.2d 510
(Ohio 1991).
32 See, e.g., Perry v. State, 853 P.2d 198 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
33 See, e.g., State v. Hacheney, 158 P.3d 1152 (Wash. 2007); State v. Craig, 514 P.2d 151
(Wash. 1973).
34 See, e.g., Hightower v. State, 901 P.2d 397 (Wyo. 1995); Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d
486 (Wyo. 1992).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
36 See, e.g., Ex parte Johnson, 620 So. 2d 709 (Ala. 1993); Eggers v. State, 914 So. 2d 883
(Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Freeman v. State, 776 So. 2d 160 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
37 See, e.g., Hansen v. State, 845 P.2d 449 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
38 See, e.g., People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015 (Cal. 2007); People v. Ainsworth, 755 P.2d
1017 (Cal. 1988).
39 See, e.g., State v. Cheatham, 6 P.3d 815 (Idaho 2000).
40 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724 (Md. 2005); Metheny v. State, 755 A.2d 1088
(Md. 2000).
41 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Christian, 722 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 2000), abrogated on other
grounds by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 777 N.E.2d 135 (Mass. 2002).
42 See, e.g., State v. Newman, 605 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1980).
43 See, e.g., Cortinas v. State, 195 P.3d 315 (Nev. 2008); Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430 (Nev.
2007).
44 See, e.g., People v. Joyner, 257 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. 1970).
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see,46 and Texas47).  Both Hawaii and Kentucky exclude the felony murder rule
altogether from their statutes prescribing criminal homicide.48  Some courts
and commentators have also included Arkansas, Nebraska, and Michigan as
favoring the majority view,49 bringing that total number to fifteen.  However,
including these three states with the majority view arguably is misplaced for the
following reasons.  First, in Grigsby v. State,50 the Arkansas Supreme Court
adopted the res gestae approach, stating, “[w]here the killing and the felony
cannot rationally be disassociated, an inference that the killing was part of the
res gestae is justifiable, particularly as against retrospective subjective disa-
vowal.”51  Moreover, the court in Grigsby agreed with views previously
expressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hart,52
which adhered to the minority rule.53  Second, in State v. Montgomery,54 the
Nebraska Supreme Court analogized to a case from the Washington Supreme
Court55 and made positive reference to another early case from the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court,56 both holding in favor of the minority view (the line
of Pennsylvania cases supporting the minority view were later abrogated;57
however, this reversal in Pennsylvania law had yet to occur at the time the
Nebraska Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Montgomery).58  Finally,
although the Michigan Supreme Court spoke in favor of the majority view in
People v. Brannon,59 the judiciary had previously abolished the felony murder
45 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Legg, 417 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1980). But see infra notes 61-65
and accompanying text (calling into doubt the inclusion of Pennsylvania among the collec-
tion of states supporting the majority view).
46 See, e.g., State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102
(Tenn. 1999).
47 See, e.g., Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Robertson v. State,
871 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
48 See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-701, -701.5 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (West
2008).
49 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724, 729 (Md. 2005); Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 107; Cole,
supra note 2, at 18 n.20.
50 Grigsby v. State, 542 S.W.2d 275 (Ark. 1976).
51 Id. at 280-81. But see id. (agreeing with views expressed by the California Supreme
Court, a state in opposition of the minority view).
52 Commonwealth v. Hart, 170 A.2d 850, 853-54 (Pa. 1961).
53 Grigsby, 542 S.W.2d at 281-82 (discussing Hart, 170 A.2d at 853-54). But see supra
note 45 and infra note 58.
54 State v. Montgomery, 215 N.W.2d 881 (Neb. 1974).
55 See id. at 884 (referencing factual similarities to State v. Craig, 514 P.2d 151 (Wash.
1973)).
56 See id. (citing text from Commonwealth v. Butcher, 304 A.2d 150 (Pa. 1973)).
57 But see Commonwealth v. Garcia, 479 A.2d 473, 477 n.3 (Pa. 1984) (calling into doubt
the court’s continued adherence to the majority view); infra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
58 See Commonwealth v. Legg, 417 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Pa. 1980) (departing from previous
holdings subscribing to the minority view and adopting the position the court took in Com-
monwealth v. Spallone, 406 A.2d 1146, 1147 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), which rendered
superfluous the relevant language purportedly adopting the minority view in Butcher).
59 People v. Brannon, 486 N.W.2d 83, 85-86 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the “fel-
ony-murder doctrine will not apply if the intent to steal property of the victim was not
formed until after the homicide”).
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rule altogether in People v. Aaron,60 rendering inclusion of Michigan with the
majority view irrelevant and inconsequential.
With respect to Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Garcia,61 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court called into doubt the decision to hold in favor of the
majority position first taken in Commonwealth v. Legg.62  In Garcia, Chief
Justice Nix, in a concurring opinion, was convinced the court was in error in its
decision in Legg63 and “expressed [his] view that it does not matter when the
intent to take the property of the victim occurs; it becomes a felony murder
when the deadly force is used to accomplish the theft.”64  The majority opinion
in Garcia acknowledged Chief Justice Nix’s concurrence, mentioning the sub-
sequent criticisms to the Legg decision and its departure from state precedent,
though refused to reconsider the matter because the issue was not before the
court on appeal.65  As a result, the law in Pennsylvania is ambiguous on how
the state supreme court may rule in subsequent cases presenting similar circum-
stances surrounding murder felony.
Virginia law is also uncertain with respect to the crime of murder felony.66
The Maryland Court of Appeals grouped Virginia with the minority view in
State v. Allen,67 and the Virginia Supreme Court embraced the res gestae con-
cept in connection with felony murder in Haskell v. Commonwealth.68  How-
ever, because the circumstances before the Virginia Supreme Court in Haskell
were unrelated to “afterthought” felony murder, this author cannot determine,
with any degree of certainty, how broadly or narrowly to interpret Haskell or
accurately ascertain which view Virginia favors.
In sum, by this author’s revised, though admittedly favorable, calculation,
fourteen states favored, and ten states (plus the District of Columbia) opposed,
the minority view prior to the decision rendered by the Nevada Supreme Court
in Nay v. State.69  Therefore, characterizing the current minority view as the
actual majority view may afford a more accurate description of the interstate
jurisprudence in the context of murder felony.  Alternatively, the current
minority view enjoys a similar degree of judicial support as does the current
majority view and does not suffer from any disproportionate following on the
interstate level among the states’ highest courts.  Unfortunately, from this
author’s perspective, the Nevada Supreme Court both misperceived and mis-
construed the measure of interstate support for the current minority view,
which may have influenced, in part, its decision to adopt the current majority
view in the principal case.
60 People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980). See Birdsong, supra note 2, at 20
n.135; Roth & Sundby, supra note 5, at 446 n.6, 491.
61 Garcia, 479 A.2d 473.
62 Id. at 477 n.3.
63 See id. at 481 n.2 (Nix, C.J., concurring).
64 Id. at 481 (Nix, C.J., concurring).
65 See id. at 477 n.3 (majority opinion).
66 See, e.g., Haskell v. Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477 (Va. 1978).
67 See State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724, 730 (Md. 2005).
68 See Haskell, 243 S.E.2d at 482-83.
69 Minority view figure based on the original ten states plus Arkansas, Nebraska, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia; majority view figure reduced from fifteen to ten through exclusion or
removal of Arkansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, and Pennsylvania.
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B. The Minority View
The following summarizes and illustrates how state courts interpret and
apply the minority view.  When a person commits murder within the res gestae
of a felonious act, whether the homicide preceded or succeeded the felony is
neither determinative nor dispositive—“[t]o hold otherwise would render a fel-
ony-murder conviction practically impossible where the evidence is entirely
circumstantial . . . .”70  As long as the felony and the killing are part of a single
and continuous transaction or occurrence, the temporal order between the fel-
ony and the homicide is irrelevant for the purposes of conviction.71  If a defen-
dant’s actions “are so closely connected as to be inseparable in terms of time,
place and causal relation, and the actions tend to be explanatory and incidental
to each other,” felony murder has been committed as prescribed in the statutory
sense.72  If the evidence demonstrates that the homicide and accompanying
felonious act were part of the same “criminal episode,” the prosecution is not
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the intent to commit the
felony arose before the defendant committed murder.73
Whether a killing and felonious act were part of one continuous transac-
tion or occurrence is a question of fact for the jury to decide.74  For example, a
jury is not required to believe or defer to a defendant’s defense that he commit-
ted robbery only as an “afterthought,” particularly where the evidence supports
a finding to the contrary.75  Requiring the prosecution to present witness testi-
mony that the defendant intended to rob the victim at the time he exerted the
fatal force against his victim would be erroneous because the law sanctions
proof by circumstantial evidence.76
In the context of “afterthought” robbery, as expressed by the Washington
Supreme Court, “[a] killing to facilitate a robbery would clearly be ‘in further-
ance of’ the robbery . . . [because,] where the killing itself is the force used to
obtain or retain the property, . . . the death can be said to be the probable
consequence of the felony.”77  Therefore, if the law does not require the prose-
cution to prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the predi-
cate enumerated felony prior to or contemporaneously with committing the
homicidal act, it is not a defense that the defendant lacked the intent to rob his
victim at the moment the killing took place.78  Where “the two crimes were
inextricably interwoven,” and there was such “continuity of evil action”
70 See State v. Nelson, 338 P.2d 301, 306-07 (N.M. 1959).
71 See State v. Roseborough, 472 S.E.2d 763, 767 (N.C. 1996); see also State v. Harris, 589
N.W.2d 782, 792 (Minn. 1999) (noting that, as long as the killing took place in the same
chain of events as the underlying felony, it does not matter whether the killing preceded or
followed the felonious act).
72 See Perry v. State, 853 P.2d 198, 200 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting Clark v. State,
558 P.2d 674, 678 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)).
73 People v. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d 783, 790 (Ill. 1990) (citing People v. Thomas, 561
N.E.2d 57 (Ill. 1990)).
74 See, e.g., Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 492 (Wyo. 1992).
75 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 340 S.E.2d 862, 867 (Ga. 1986).
76 See, e.g., People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d 252, 274 (Ill. 1992).
77 See State v. Hacheney, 158 P.3d 1152, 1160 n.6 (Wash. 2007) (citing State v. Allen, 147
P.3d 581 (Wash. 2006)).
78 See, e.g., State v. Craig, 514 P.2d 151, 155-56 (Wash. 1973).
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between the two offenses as to form “part of the same criminal enterprise,”79
the defendant cannot escape application of the felony-murder rule.80
C. The Majority View
1. General Principles
The following discusses how state courts interpret and apply the majority
view.  A felony, either accompanying or incidental, yet unrelated to, a homi-
cide, committed as a mere afterthought, should neither support nor sustain a
conviction for felony murder.81  The prosecution cannot proceed on felony
murder charges against an accused with evidence insufficient to reasonably
infer that the accused formed the intent to commit the felony prior to commit-
ting homicide.82  Nor can the prosecution proceed with felony murder charges
where the defendant formulated his intent to rob his victim after killing his
victim.83  A judge should instruct the jury that the defendant must have had the
intent to rob his victim at the time he committed murder.84  As expressed by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, “the point at which [a defendant] formulated
his intent to take his victim’s property is critical to differentiating, in the
abstract, between his commission of capital murder in the course of robbery
[(felony murder)] and his commission of first degree murder, followed by theft
. . . .”
85
Two states in particular have criticized and opposed the minority view,
evidenced by the lengthy court opinions, almost treatise-like in nature and
intended effect, with respect to “afterthought robbery,” issued by the highest
courts in Maryland and Tennessee in State v. Allen86 and State v. Buggs,87
respectively.  The Nevada Supreme Court relied heavily on, and afforded a
moderate degree of deference to, the insight provided by these two decisions in
reaching its own decision in Nay v. State.88
In Allen, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that “a defendant is guilty of
first-degree felony-murder only if the defendant’s intent to commit the predi-
cate enumerated felony [arose] prior to, or concurrent with, the conduct result-
ing in death.”89  The court based its decision, in large part, on two of the
underlying principles of the felony murder doctrine:  deterrence and the legal
79 Haskell v. Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (Va. 1978).
80 State v. Williams, 660 N.E.2d 724, 732 (Ohio 1996).
81 See People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015, 1072 (Cal. 2007); see also Eggers v. State, 914 So.
2d 883, 909 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Commonwealth v. Spallone, 406 A.2d 1146, 1147 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979).
82 See, e.g., State v. Cheatham, 6 P.3d 815, 819 (Idaho 2000).
83 See People v. Joyner, 257 N.E.2d 26, 27 (N.Y. 1970).
84 See, e.g., State v. Newman, 605 S.W.2d 781, 786-87 (Mo. 1980).
85 See, e.g., White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
86 State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724 (Md. 2005).
87 State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1999).
88 See Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 434-35 (Nev. 2007).  For the purposes of this Note, the
author maintains that the Maryland and Tennessee courts, among others in support of the
majority view, misconstrued the implications, support, application, and effect of the minority
view.
89 Allen, 875 A.2d at 728.
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fiction of transferred intent.90  Placing a substantial amount of emphasis on
social policy, the court of appeals ruled in accord with those courts and crimi-
nal scholars embracing the majority view,91 holding “that there can be no fel-
ony-murder where the felony occurs as an afterthought following the killing.”92
Similarly, in Buggs, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that, although the
statute on felony murder does not mandate that the felony precede the killing to
support a conviction for felony murder,93 “[i]f [the] accused had no intent to
commit the underlying felony at the time of the killing, the basis for the felony-
murder rule does not apply.”94  In line with the underlying rationales proposed
by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Allen, the court in Buggs was reluctant to
extend the felony murder doctrine in the context of “afterthought” robbery.95
2. Underlying Similarities with the Minority View
Although the principles and rationales for the majority view and the
minority view in murder felony situations stand in direct opposition, courts
adopting the majority view still seemingly incorporate certain criteria underly-
ing the minority view.  For example, courts adhering to the majority view still
import similar language in accord with the res gestae approach to felony mur-
der, requiring the prosecution to demonstrate that the two offenses were part of
a “continuous chain” of events,96 “one continuous transaction,”97 or of “the
same general criminal occurrence.”98  Even the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Buggs required a killing “[to have] an intimate relation and close connection
with the felony[,] . . . [to] not be separate, distinct, and independent from it . . .
[and to have] a connection in time, place and continuity of action.”99
In addition, notwithstanding the reasons behind adopting the majority
view, nearly every state court allows the matter to proceed to the jury, which
may infer, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the evi-
dence demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had the req-
uisite intent to commit the felony at the time of, or prior to, the killing.100
According to the Court in Buggs, it is a “generally accepted” principle, particu-
larly in robbery-murder cases, “that the intent to rob may be inferred from a
defendant’s actions immediately following a killing.”101  Rather than prohibit,
as a matter of law, “afterthought” robbery to serve as a predicate felony for
90 See id. at 729-33.
91 See id.
92 Id. at 733.
93 State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1999).
94 Id. at 107.
95 See id.
96 See, e.g., Ex parte Johnson, 620 So. 2d 709, 714 (Ala. 1993); Eggers v. State, 914 So. 2d
883, 910 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
97 See, e.g., People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015, 1072 (Cal. 2007).
98 See, e.g., State v. Cheatham, 6 P.3d 815, 821 (Idaho 2000).
99 See State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 663 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting WHARTON ON HOMICIDE
§ 126 (3d ed. 1907) and Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 106).
100 See Eggers, 914 So. 2d at 910; Prince, 156 P.3d at 1072-73; State v. Allen, 875 A.2d
724, 733 (Md. 2005); State v. Newman, 605 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Mo. 1980); Rice, 184 S.W.3d
at 662-64; Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
101 Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 108 n.3.
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felony murder,102 a court should permit the jury to determine whether the
“afterthought” defense is wholly unreasonable, or even illogical.103  Although
the defense may argue that the felonious act was merely an afterthought and
unrelated to the homicidal act, the question of intent is a matter best left for the
jury to decide.
D. The Law in Nevada prior to Nay v. State
1. Early Use of the Res Gestae Approach by the Nevada Supreme
Court in the Context of Felony Murder
The Nevada Legislature codified felony murder under section 200.030 of
the Nevada Revised Statutes.  The statute provides, in pertinent part, that mur-
der “[c]ommitted in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of . . . robbery”
is murder in the first degree.104
As first prescribed by the Nevada Supreme Court in 1867 in State v. Mil-
lain,105 “[t]he law presumes that every unlawful voluntary killing is mur-
der.”106  In Millain, evidence showing that the defendant meticulously killed
his victim by striking her over the head, choking and strangling her, then imme-
diately robbing her, sufficiently allowed the court to reasonably infer “that the
deliberation required to effect the robbery must have been the result of a well
matured plan either to murder and rob, or at least to plunder the house, and to
murder if necessary in carrying out the main object.”107  Although the context
of murder felony was not before the court, the court implicitly adopted and
applied a res gestae approach to felony murder.
In general, under the res gestae approach to felony murder, the law will
attach together those acts immediately preceding, or immediately succeeding,
the commission of a homicide.108  As discussed by the Nevada Supreme Court
in State v. Fouquette,109 the res gestae approach to a crime
embraces not only the actual facts of the transaction and the circumstances surround-
ing it, but the matters immediately antecedent to and having a direct causal connec-
tion with it, as well as acts immediately following it and so closely connected with it
as to form in reality a part of the [same] occurrence.110
The Court in Fouquette required the homicide, for the purposes of felony
murder, to be “within the res gestae of the initial crime, and [be] an emanation
thereof.”111
102 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Newman, 605 S.W.2d at 786 (“The jury [is] at liberty to reject as unreasonable
an explanation that robbery was an afterthought to a justifiable homicide[, and] . . . might
well consider that such behavior would be so destructive of a defense to the homicide as to
be wholly illogical.”); see also Eggers, 914 So. 2d at 910 (“The jury may infer from the facts
and circumstances that the robbery began when the accused attacked the victim and the
capital offense was consummated when the defendant took the victim’s property and fled.”).
104 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (2007).
105 State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 409 (1867).
106 Id. at 445.
107 Id. at 484.
108 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
109 State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404 (Nev. 1950).
110 Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
111 Id. at 416-17.
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The Nevada Supreme Court offered further guidance on the law surround-
ing felony murder in Payne v. State.112  In Payne, the court noted that the
original purpose behind the felony murder doctrine was to hold a felon strictly
liable for any negligent or accidental killings resulting from the commission or
attempted commission of a felony.113  Although the circumstances in Payne
involved the prototypical felony murder context, the court adopted the res ges-
tae approach and the corresponding principle of causation.114  The court
required that the killing “be linked to or part of the series of incidents so as to
be one continuous transaction” in order to fall within the scope of the felony
murder doctrine.115  Furthermore, the court noted, “[t]he res gestae of the crime
begins at the point where an indictable attempt is reached and ends where the
chain of events between the attempted crime or completed felony is
broken[.]”116
The Nevada Supreme Court’s position in Payne arguably encompasses the
situation presented in Nay v. State relative to the context of “afterthought” rob-
bery, where a homicide occurs before the felonious act takes place.117  There-
fore, the court had ample authority to adopt the minority view in Nay without
facing subsequent criticism for acting beyond the scope of the court’s authority.
2. Robbery
To properly analyze the principal case with respect to the Nevada
Supreme Court’s decision on murder felony, the following is a brief synopsis of
the law in Nevada on robbery.118  The material should help the reader under-
stand the context of “afterthought” robbery with respect to the felony murder
doctrine.
The Nevada Legislature codified the crime of robbery under section
200.380 of the Nevada Revised Statutes as follows:
Robbery is the unlawful taking of personal property from the person of another, or in
his presence, against his will, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, imme-
diate or future, to his person or property, or the person or property of a member of his
family, or of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery.  A taking is by means
of force or fear if force or fear is used to:
(a) Obtain or retain possession of the property . . .
The degree of force used is immaterial if it is used to compel acquiescence to
the taking of or escaping with the property.  A taking constitutes robbery whenever it
appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the
person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or
fear.119
The Nevada Supreme Court has incorporated the following additional
nuances relative to the law on robbery.  Robbery need not be confined to a
112 Payne v. State, 406 P.2d 922 (Nev. 1965).
113 Id. at 924.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See infra Part III.A.
118 See supra note 8.
119 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.380(1) (2007).
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fixed locus or particular period of time,120 and the acts of violence and intimi-
dation may precede the actual taking of property and may be intended for
another purpose altogether.121  Moreover, the evidence will suffice, for the pur-
poses of conviction, if it demonstrates that the defendant “[took] advantage of
the terrifying situation he created” and fled the scene of the crime with the
victim’s property.122  Finally, a victim of robbery need not be a living
person.123
3. A Former, Indirect Approach to “Afterthought” Robbery by the
Nevada Supreme Court
A recent decision issued by the Nevada Supreme Court sheds additional
light on the court’s use of the felony murder doctrine in Nevada and provides
further support for concluding that the court should have upheld the defen-
dant’s conviction for felony murder in the principal case in light of ample cir-
cumstantial evidence presented to the jury.  In Leonard v. State,124 the
defendant argued that he failed to form the intent to rob his victim until after he
killed him.125  In brief, the defendant, victim, and other acquaintances were out
drinking at a bar one evening.126  The defendant and the victim had previously
gotten into a dispute over a debt owed by the victim to the defendant.127  The
police later discovered the defendant to be in possession of several of the vic-
tim’s goods.128  A witness testified that the defendant confided in him that he
had killed the victim,129 even though the defendant and victim were friends.130
The court determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for robbery and to infer that the
defendant had killed his victim to obtain his possessions.131  The court rejected
the defendant’s contention that “the instruction on the felony murder rule failed
to inform the jury that the homicide must occur in the course of the commission
of a felony, and not vice versa, [in order] for the rule to apply.”132
120 Norman v. Sheriff, Clark County, 558 P.2d 541, 542 (Nev. 1976).
121 Sheriff, Clark County v. Jefferson, 649 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Nev. 1982). See also Chappell
v. State, 972 P.2d 838, 841 (Nev. 1998) (holding that the law “does not require that the force
or violence be committed with the specific intent to commit robbery”).
122 Jefferson, 649 P.2d at 1367.
123 Leonard v. State (Leonard II), 17 P.3d 397, 412 (Nev. 2001).
124 Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 969 P.2d 288 (Nev. 1998). See also Leonard II, 17 P.3d
397 (involving the court’s affirmation of another felony murder conviction for the same
defendant under the same circumstances based on circumstantial evidence whereby the
defendant was found to be in possession of the victim’s goods and the jury reasonably
inferred that the robbery occurred at the time of, or immediately following, the killing).
125 Leonard I, 969 P.2d at 297.
126 Id. at 291-93.
127 Id. at 291.
128 Id. at 292-93.
129 Id. at 293.
130 See id.
131 Id. at 297.  Note that the jury could infer that the defendant had the requisite intent to
rob the victim at the time of the homicide; the record presented nothing to prove or disprove
this claim.
132 Id. at 296.  The court in Nay seemingly ruled otherwise by finding harmless error in the
district court’s failure to so instruct the jury. See Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 436 (Nev.
2007).
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Based on the court’s ruling in Leonard, it remains questionable why the
Nevada Supreme Court overlooked this portion of the Leonard opinion in
reaching its decision in Nay v. State.  Without expressly denouncing or repudi-
ating Leonard, the court in Nay overlooked mandatory precedential case law in
favor of the law in other states and implemented a new rule of law governing
the felony murder doctrine.
III. THE PRINCIPAL CASE: NAY V. STATE
A. Factual Background
The following is a summary of the facts and circumstances in Nay v. State
as presented by Justice Cherry, author of the majority opinion.133  Christopher
Nay (“Nay”) first met the decedent, Elijah Ansah (“Ansah”), in April 2003.134
Shortly thereafter, Ansah moved in with Nay.135  In an interview with the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Nay recounted the sequence of events
leading to Ansah’s death.136  In the early morning hours of July 27, 2003,
around twelve thirty or one a.m., Joshua McCrarey, one of Nay’s friends, drove
both Nay and Ansah out to Lone Mountain to drop them off to meet some
girls.137  No other individuals were present at or near the scene of the crime.138
Ansah brought a handgun and Nay brought a baseball bat.139  Notably,
“[a]lthough Nay claimed he got the bat . . . to protect himself from a gang
member,” Michael Eaton, another one of Nay’s friends, “claimed that Nay . . .
made a joke about using [the bat] to pull a ‘lick’—catching someone off guard,
knocking them out, and quickly taking their possessions.”140
After waiting approximately twenty minutes, Nay asked Ansah where the
girls were.141  Ansah then allegedly became rather hostile and pulled the hand-
gun on Nay.142  A fight ensued, whereby Nay hit Ansah in the back of the head
with the bat between five and eight times, and kicked him in the stomach and
the ribs.143  Afterward, Nay feared that either Ansah was dead, or, if he was not
dead, that he might get back up and try to shoot him.144  Nay first tried to burn
Ansah’s shirt with a lighter, then decided to take Ansah’s shoes, fearing they
had his fingerprints on them.145  He also went through Ansah’s pants and took
133 Nay, 167 P.3d at 431.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 432.
137 Id. at 432 n.2.
138 Id. at 432.
139 Id.  Why either individual needed to bring a weapon to meet up with “some girls” raises
the first of a series of questions regarding the underlying circumstances of the supposedly
“casual” visit to Lone Mountain, particularly given the absence of any other individuals at
the time of the incident.  In this author’s opinion, the matter further explains how the jury
reached its verdict and why the jury disregarded Nay’s “afterthought” defense.
140 Id. at 432 n.3.
141 Id. at 432.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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his money, marijuana, and the handgun; during his interview with the police,
Nay alleged that he might as well get something from Ansah because Ansah
had threatened to shoot him.146  However, Nay also told police that “he had no
intention to rob or kill Ansah.”147
Nay subsequently walked to his apartment and threw Ansah’s clothes in a
dumpster.148  Later that morning, around six forty-five a.m., two hikers at Lone
Mountain discovered Ansah’s body.149  He had suffered “blunt force injuries to
his head and body, and . . . appeared [to have been] set on fire postmortem.”150
The autopsy revealed high levels of hydrocondone, a narcotic analgesic, in
Ansah’s system.151
According to the record, Nay made the following comments to both
friends and acquaintances after the incident:  that he “used [the] bat to commit a
robbery;” that he “used the bat in a ‘lick;’” that he “‘jumped’ Ansah to get [his]
money;” and that he acquired some cash, marijuana, and a handgun by putting
a “‘lick on Ansah.”152  Further, friends attested to Nay having made up his own
rap lyrics about the incident as follows:  “‘I bashed someone over the head,
now he lies dead behind Lone Mountain.’”153  Out of suspicion that Nay may
have killed Ansah, four acquaintances of Nay contacted the police to recount
Nay’s comments.154
B. Procedural History
Nay admitted to the police that he killed Ansah.155  The State charged him
with first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and for robbery with
the use of a deadly weapon.156  The State “alleged that Nay beat his roommate
. . . to death with a baseball bat and took his money, marijuana, and hand-
gun.”157  Nay claimed self-defense and that he “only decided to take Ansah’s
property after he believed Ansah was dead.”158
The jury found Nay guilty on both counts.159  The district court sentenced
Nay to two consecutive life sentences for the first charge and two 35- to 156-
month sentences for the second charge.160  Nay appealed both convictions.161
146 Id.
147 Id.  This single statement appeared to be rather dispositive in the Nevada Supreme
Court’s disposition, even though numerous contradictory statements made by both Nay and
his mutual acquaintances seemingly led the jury to an opposite conclusion. See id. at 432-
33; supra text accompanying note 140; infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
148 Nay, 167 P.3d at 432.
149 Id. at 431.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 431-32.
152 Id. at 432-33.
153 Id. at 433.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 432.
156 Id. at 431.
157 Id.
158 Id. (emphasis added).
159 Id. at 433.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 430.
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C. On Appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court
The Nevada Supreme Court phrased the main issue on appeal as follows:
“whether a defendant may be found guilty of first-degree felony murder if the
intent to commit the predicate enumerated felony [arose] after the conduct
resulting in death.”162  Nay argued that the district court should have instructed
the jury that “a robbery committed as an afterthought to a murder cannot sup-
port a felony-murder conviction.”163  Although procedural issues involving
jury instructions generally require an abuse of discretion or judicial error stan-
dard of review, the court imposed a de novo standard of review because the
substantive issue presented a legal question of first impression.164
Section 200.030(1)(b) of the Nevada Revised Statutes prescribes the ele-
ments of felony murder.165  The court initially found the statute to be ambigu-
ous because it failed to define “in perpetration or attempted perpetration” of
one of the predicate enumerated felonies.166  Nay asserted that he did not
intend to rob Ansah at the time he killed him, and therefore, the killing did not
occur “in the perpetration of” the robbery as required by the language of the
statute.167  By contrast, the State argued that intent was irrelevant under the
statute and, because the force or violence used to kill Ansah was necessary for
Nay to commit the robbery, the force or violence used to kill Ansah was “in the
perpetration of” the robbery.168
In observing that both interpretations of the felony murder statute were
reasonable, the Nevada Supreme Court looked to other state law to ascertain
how other courts have handled factually similar circumstances.169  Nay based
his argument on the “majority view” with respect to “afterthought” robbery in
the context of felony murder.170  By contrast, the State proposed the “minority
view,” where the timeframe for when a defendant forms “the intent to commit
the underlying felony . . . is irrelevant,” and the felony murder doctrine applies
so long as the “robbery and murder are part and parcel of one continuous
action.”171  Relying primarily on State v. Buggs172 and State v. Allen,173 the
Nevada Supreme Court expressed two main reasons why it chose to adopt the
majority view as the “better view.”174  First, the court explained that the pur-
pose underlying the felony murder doctrine becomes inapplicable if the defen-
dant did not have the intent to commit the felony at the time he committed the
162 Id. at 431.
163 Id. at 433.
164 Id.
165 Id. See supra text accompanying note 104.
166 Nay, 167 P.3d at 433-34.
167 Id. at 433.
168 Id. at 434.
169 Id.  As maintained infra in Part IV.A.1, it is unbeknownst to the author of this Note why
the court was not comfortable drawing support exclusively from precedent case authority,
something the concurring opinion touched upon briefly. See infra text accompanying notes
185-87.
170 Nay, 167 P.3d at 434.
171 Id. at 434-35.
172 State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1999).
173 State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724 (Md. 2005).
174 Nay, 167 P.3d at 434-35.
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homicide because the rule tries to deter a person from committing a felony in a
dangerous manner, even if the killing is accidental or unintentional.175  Second,
the court explained that, in order to satisfy the underlying legal fiction behind
the felony murder rule (that the intent to commit a dangerous felony supplies
the requisite intent to kill), the defendant must have had the intent to commit
the felony at the time he committed homicide.176
The court offered two reasons why it opposed adopting the minority
view.177  First, the court noted that a lack of intent to commit the predicate
enumerated felony (fatally) eradicates the intent otherwise supplied to satisfy a
conviction for murder.178  Second, the court stated that the minority view
expanded, rather than restricted, the felony murder rule, contrary to the weight
of authority calling for a restriction of the doctrine.179  Therefore, the court
concluded that, to convict a defendant of first-degree felony murder, the defen-
dant must have formed the intent to commit the felony either before or during
the conduct resulting in the victim’s death.180
In light of having accepted and adopted the majority view, the court found
that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury with regard to “after-
thought” robbery, amounting to judicial error.181  Applying harmless-error
review, the court observed that the district court only instructed the jury on
intent with respect to committing robbery (where the timeframe is irrele-
vant).182  Additionally, the court held that the district court’s error was not
harmless because the verdict did not differentiate whether the jury convicted
Nay for first-degree murder or for felony murder, which required the court to
reverse and remand Nay’s conviction with respect to first-degree murder with
the use of a deadly weapon.183  Notwithstanding, the court affirmed Nay’s con-
viction with respect to robbery with the use of a deadly weapon.184
Chief Justice Maupin, with whom Justice Hardesty agreed, filed a concur-
ring opinion.185  In his concurrence, Chief Justice Maupin renounced any fault
the majority opinion may have attributed to the district court in so construing
state precedent as to embrace the minority, rather than majority, view.186
Rather, he asked the court to acknowledge that the district court fairly assessed
175 Id. at 434.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 435.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 431.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 435.
183 Id. at 435-36.
184 Id. at 436.  The Court made this determination without providing any supporting analy-
sis, stating simply that “the jury was presented with overwhelming evidence to support the
robbery charge, including Nay’s admission that he robbed Ansah.” Id.  The author of this
Note challenges the reader to find a reason why the court decided to reverse Nay’s murder
conviction, while simultaneously affirming his robbery conviction.
185 Id. at 436.
186 Id.
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precedent case law and had reason for deciding to adopt, albeit implicitly, the
minority view.187
The next part of this Note proposes why, from a number of legal and
social policy perspectives, the Nevada Supreme Court incorrectly decided Nay
by adopting the majority view.  The author of this Note hopes that, should
another case involving murder felony come before the court in the future, the
court will take a second look at its decision in Nay, as well as the case law from
other states holding to the contrary, and reevaluate the decision to disavow the
minority view.188
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Nevada Supreme Court Erred in Rejecting the Minority View—The
Better Approach in the Context of Murder-Robbery
1. The Court’s Decision Imposes a New Burden on the State Not
Found in the Felony Murder Statute or State Precedent 
As discussed earlier in this Note, to convict a defendant for robbery in
Nevada, the State need only prove that the defendant took advantage of the
dangerous or terrifying situation he created to rob his victim.189  The State is
not required to prove that the defendant used force or violence with a specific
intent to commit robbery.190  Therefore, requiring the State to prove that a
defendant had the requisite intent to commit robbery at the time he created a
dangerous or terrifying situation using force or violence in the context of felony
murder is inconsistent because it imposes an additional burden on the State not
otherwise required by statute.
When the State presents its case against a defendant for murder “in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration” of robbery,191 the State must prove the
following.  First, the State must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant committed robbery.  Then, the State must show that, as per the
clear and unambiguous language of the felony murder statute, the homicide
occurred in the perpetration of the robbery.  The dispositive portion of the
State’s presentation of its case is proving the commission of the robbery.  The
Nevada statute on robbery does not require the State to show that the defendant
had the specific intent to commit robbery at the time the offense took place.192
Thereafter, the State must establish a causal connection between the homicide
and the robbery by showing that the defendant committed homicide during the
187 Id. at 437.  For the reasons set forth in this Note, the author agrees with Chief Justice
Maupin that the trial court correctly interpreted precedent case law, and questions why the
majority did not go so far as to overrule precedent outright.
188 But see supra note 16 (discussing a recent opinion issued by the Nevada Supreme Court,
Cortinas v. State, 195 P.3d 315 (Nev. 2008), reaffirming the decision in Nay).
189 See Sheriff, Clark County v. Jefferson, 649 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Nev. 1982); see also supra
Part II.D.2.
190 Chappell v. State, 972 P.2d 838, 841 (Nev. 1998).
191 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (2007).
192 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.380(1) (2007); see also supra text accompanying note 119.
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sequence of events surrounding the robbery.193  However, Nevada law does not
require any proof that the defendant had a specific intent to commit murder, as
evident from the plain language of the relevant provision governing felony
murder.194  To hold otherwise requires a district court to read an element of
intent into the felony murder statute, a task vested in the powers of the Nevada
Legislature and outside the bounds of the court’s established authority under
the Nevada Constitution.195
In the principal case, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s
conviction for robbery.196  The court did not justify this conclusion, other than
stating that there was “overwhelming” evidence supporting the conviction.197
Therefore, in light of the elements prescribed in Nevada’s statute governing
robbery,198 the author of this Note must assume that the prosecution satisfied
its requisite burden of proof with respect to the following findings in the district
court:  1) the force or violence used for the unlawful taking of the victim’s
property ultimately killed the victim; 2) the taking was against the victim’s
will; 3) the force or violence was immediate; and 4) the taking, by means of
force or violence, was to obtain the possession of the victim’s property.  The
court’s reason behind foregoing affirmation of the defendant’s conviction for
felony murder is both suspect and clouded because the four essential findings
outlined above appear to satisfy the “in perpetration” requirement for felony
murder for the following reasons:  1) fatally hitting the victim over the head
with a baseball bat supplied the force or violence used to commit robbery; 2)
the victim did not willingly hand over his personal property; 3) the beating (and
killing) took place at the time when the robbery occurred; and 4) the taking of
the victim’s property through the use of force and violence, resulting in the
victim’s death, was to acquire the victim’s money, marijuana, and handgun.
Further, the defendant made numerous bragging statements to acquaintances
that he did rob Ansah by using the baseball bat, and only later told the police
that he did not originally intend to rob his victim.199  Both the first-hand state-
ments of Nay, as well as those of his friends, served as ample circumstantial
evidence of the defendant’s guilt and further corroborated the State’s charge,
and the jury’s conviction, for first-degree felony murder with the use of a
deadly weapon.
Although the circumstances in the principal case materialize into an inti-
mate connection between the homicide and the robbery, thereby proving the
homicide was within the res gestae of the robbery,200 the robbery appears to
193 See, e.g., Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852, 856 (Nev. 1983) (noting the
requirement of a direct causal connection between the robbery and homicide).
194 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (2007); see also Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 434
(Nev. 2007) (noting that interpreting the statute as not demanding a specific intent to commit
robbery is reasonable).
195 See, e.g., Seaborn v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 29 P.2d 500, 503 (Nev. 1934) (noting that
a court does not have legislative powers to “read into a statute something beyond the mani-
fest intention of the Legislature, as gathered from the statute”).
196 Nay, 167 P.3d at 436.
197 See id.; see also supra note 184.
198 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.380(1) (2007); see also supra text accompanying note 119.
199 See Nay, 167 P.3d at 432-33; supra text accompanying notes 140, 146-47, 152-54.
200 See infra Part IV.A.2.
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have been the underlying crime from the outset.  The statements Nay volunta-
rily made to his friends are arguably more reliable than those he made to the
police after being taken into custody.  Although one may infer that Nay only
bragged to his friends and applied a certain amount of puffery to the events that
took place, one could just as reasonably infer that Nay robbed and killed his
victim to “up” his street credibility, and later lied to the police to try to mitigate
the gravity of the situation.  As discussed earlier, Nay and Ansah were carrying
a baseball bat and a handgun, respectively, out late at night, in a relatively
isolated area, supposedly looking for girls.  A person can easily carry a con-
cealed handgun, whereas a baseball bat is rather large and conspicuous by
nature.  These facts and circumstances hardly lead a reasonably prudent person
to infer that the defendant had no intent to kill the victim in order to rob him of
his possessions any more so than actually having intended to commit robbery.
Either way, the jury properly considered the totality of the evidence and found
the intimate connection between the robbery and the murder, without any
demand by law to take the defendant’s unscrupulous “afterthought” defense at
anything more than face value, particularly when the circumstances all but
pointed to the contrary.201
To summarize, given the statutory elements of robbery, when a defendant
commits a homicidal act (a dangerous or terrifying situation in it of itself), even
if the defendant did not originally intend to rob his victim, the “in perpetration”
component of the felony murder rule is satisfied.  Had the defendant not com-
mitted the killing, the elements constituting robbery would not be present.202  A
killing used to facilitate obtaining the property of another is the “probable con-
sequence of the felony.”203  Where a court sanctions drawing a connection
from a homicidal act to a robbery to satisfy a conviction for robbery, while
proscribing any connection from the robbery back to the homicide to satisfy a
conviction for felony murder, the court is ignoring the general principles behind
the res gestae approach.204  The Nevada Supreme Court relied on less evidence
in Leonard v. State to affirm the defendant’s conviction, and even rejected the
defendant’s request for an instruction analogous to the majority view.205  As a
result, the court departed from mandatory state precedent, read an element of
intent into the felony murder statute, and reversed the jury’s conviction, irre-
spective of the weight of the evidence, by failing to acknowledge the obvious
connection between the robbery and homicidal act.
201 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 340 S.E.2d 862, 867 (Ga. 1986); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d
782, 793 (Minn. 1999); State v. Handy, 419 S.E.2d 545, 552 (N.C. 1992); Bouwkamp v.
State, 833 P.2d 486, 492 (Wyo. 1992).
202 This argument relates to the causation component of the res gestae approach, discussed
infra Part IVA.2.b.
203 See State v. Hacheney, 158 P.3d 1152, 1160 n.6 (Wash. 2007) (citing State v. Allen, 147
P.3d 581 (Wash. 2006)).
204 But see Metheny v. State, 755 A.2d 1088, 1110 (Md. 2000) (arguing that the foregoing
line of reasoning is “troubling [because it requires] simultaneously looking back in time at
the application of force to find a robbery while looking forward in time to the taking of
property to find a felony murder, where, in fact, no felony was contemplated when the homi-
cide occurred”).
205 See Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 969 P.2d 288, 291-93, 296-97 (Nev. 1998); see also
supra Part II.D.3.
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2. Res Gestae Embraces “Afterthought” Robbery and Warrants
Having Affirmed, not Reversed, Nay’s Conviction for First-Degree
Murder
Under the res gestae approach, a court must analyze the elements of time,
distance, or place, and causation between the felony and the homicidal act
before imposing the felony murder rule upon a defendant accused of homicide
in the context of “afterthought” robbery.206  As set forth below, the facts and
circumstances presented in Nay v. State satisfy each of these elements to prove
the homicide took place within the res gestae of the robbery.
a. Time and Distance or Place
The prosecution must show a close degree of proximity in terms of time
and distance (or place) between the felonious act and the homicide to prove the
offenses were essentially part of a “single series of continuous acts.”207  In
other words, to demonstrate that the death occurred as part of the acts leading
up to the felonious act, there must not be a substantial passage of time, nor
great distance between, the homicide and felonious act.208  Rather, the court
must find unity with respect to time and place between the homicide and the
felonious act; a sheer coincidence of time and place will not suffice.209
The facts and circumstances presented in Nay indicate that the prosecution
satisfied the time and distance elements.  Nay admitted that, immediately after
realizing that he may have killed Ansah, he took his victim’s pants containing
the money and marijuana, as well as the victim’s handgun.210  Nay did not
leave the area and return later to collect Ansah’s belongings.  Nay showed off
the stolen handgun, cash, and marijuana to his friends,211 as if pleased with his
accomplishments.  Although the police may not have had the means of deduc-
ing the exact time frame between the killing and the robbery given the lack of
any eyewitnesses, the jury could reasonably infer that the two offenses were
both connected and interrelated with respect to time because the police discov-
ered the victim’s body only hours after the incident212 and the police found Nay
in possession of the goods taken from the victim.213  In addition, both offenses
occurred at the exact same location.214  The defendant did not kill Ansah, move
the body to another location, and later conceive of the notion of robbing his
206 See, e.g., State v. Heden, 719 N.W.2d 689, 697 (Minn. 2006); Perry v. State, 853 P.2d
198, 200 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Haskell v. Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 482-83 (Va.
1978); Hacheney, 158 P.3d at 1157-60. See also supra note 22 (discussing the requisite
elements necessary to show a crime is committed within the res gestae of another offense).
207 See, e.g., People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d 252, 274 (Ill. 1992); see also State v. Buggs, 995
S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1999); Hacheney, 158 P.3d at 1157-60.
208 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 660 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1996).
209 See, e.g., United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301, 1309 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Hacheney, 158 P.3d at 1157; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 71 (2008); 40 C.J.S. Homicide
§ 56 (2006); 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 150 (15th ed. 2007).
210 See Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 432 (Nev. 2007).
211 See id. at 432-33.
212 See id. at 431-32.
213 See id.
214 Id.
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victim.  Rather, the incidents all occurred somewhere in the middle of the night
at Lone Mountain.215
In sum, the evidence showed unity of time and place between the homi-
cide and robbery, not a mere coincidence between the two offenses.  The res
gestae approach emphasizes how the two offenses in Nay were incidental and
explanatory of one another.  Had the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the
minority view, the facts and circumstances justify the jury’s first-degree murder
conviction with the use of a deadly weapon.
b. Causation
Along with the elements discussed above, under a res gestae approach, the
State needs to show a causal relationship between the felony and the homi-
cide.216  The circumstances must have a direct causal connection with one
another to show continuity of action.217  The death must be a probable conse-
quence of the felony or a foreseeable consequence of the initial criminal con-
duct to establish a legal relationship between the two offenses.218
The evidence presented to the court in Nay met the causality requirement.
First, but for the defendant having used force and violence to kill his victim, the
defendant would not have created a terrifying or dangerous situation enabling
him to commit robbery.  Moreover, a reasonably prudent person may foresee
that striking someone over the back of the head with a baseball bat five to eight
times may either seriously injure or kill the person.  In other words, the defen-
dant’s conduct proximately caused the victim’s death.219  By attacking the vic-
tim with such force and violence, the homicide was undoubtedly linked with
the robbery.  Therefore, as noted in the preceding section, had the court adopted
the minority view, the facts and circumstances warranted a conviction for first-
degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon.
c. The Elements Combined Show the Two Offenses as “Part and
Parcel” of the Same Underlying Occurrence 
As explained throughout this Note, res gestae encompasses “things done
in and about, and as a part of, the transaction out of which the litigation in hand
grew and on which transaction said litigation is based.”220  If “the murderous
act is ‘part and parcel’ of the same transaction as the felony,” the felony murder
rule applies to the conduct,221 irrespective of the underlying sequence of
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., State v. Heden, 719 N.W.2d 689, 697 (Minn. 2006); State v. Nelson, 338 P.2d
301, 306 (N.M. 1959); Perry v. State, 853 P.2d 198, 200 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Haskell v.
Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 482-83 (Va. 1978).
217 See, e.g., Haskell, 243 S.E.2d at 483.
218 See, e.g., 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 55-56 (2006).
219 See, e.g., 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 71 (2008) (“In determining whether there is a
causal relation, some courts have suggested using ‘but for’ causation, or that the death would
not have occurred but for the unlawful conduct.  The unlawful act must be the proximate
cause of death, or death must be the probable consequence or the natural or necessary result
of the unlawful act.”) (footnotes omitted).
220 Garcia v. State, 68 N.W.2d 151, 160 (Neb. 1955) (quoting Collins v. State, 64 N.W. 432,
434 (Neb. 1895)).
221 Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 435 (Nev. 2007).
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events.222  The Nevada Supreme Court previously adopted and implemented
the concept of res gestae and the principle of causation with respect to felony
murder.223  The court should have implemented the same approach in Nay.
In the principal case, although the homicide occurred prior to the comple-
tion of the robbery, the issue is irrelevant because the res gestae approach
embraces “matters immediately antecedent to and having a direct causal con-
nection with [the felonious act].”224  The moment the defendant began to strike
his victim over the head with the baseball bat, which the district court seem-
ingly attributed to be the force or violence used to commit robbery, an “indicta-
ble attempt [was] reached.”225  Conversely, the moment the defendant left the
scene of the crime with his victim’s money, marijuana, and handgun constitutes
the point in time of the completion of the chain of events—the moment where
the “indictable attempt” ended with respect to the res gestate of the overall
occurrence.226  Unity of time, distance, and purpose were present, as well as a
direct causal connection between the two offenses.  The jury did not need an
instruction with regard to “afterthought” robbery because the defendant did not
have to commit the homicide with the specific intent to rob the victim for the
prosecution to prove robbery.
The homicide was so intimately associated and interrelated with the rob-
bery in Nay to be part of the res gestae of the robbery.  Robbery and homicide
constituted the basis for the criminal proceedings, with the evidence stemming
from the same underlying chain of events.  The two were not discrete and
mutually exclusive offenses occurring separately and distinctly from one
another.  Maintaining on appeal that the homicide was part of the res gestae of
the robbery was reasonable given that the State would not have been able to
prosecute the defendant for either robbery or homicide without introducing
facts supporting prosecution for the other offense.  Both offenses were suffi-
ciently interrelated and connected to constitute part and parcel of the same
transaction or occurrence.  For example, the State could not show that the
defendant used force or violence to create a terrifying or dangerous situation
conducive to committing robbery absent showing that the defendant killed his
victim.  To leave out or downplay this detail to prove robbery would fail to
disclose the full truth to the jury (and arguably lead the jury to question such
omission of material fact).  At the same time, in a prosecution for murder, the
State would arguably have little choice but to make specific references to the
robbery committed immediately after the homicide to show motive or intent to
commit murder.227  Looking at the facts and circumstances, the defendant’s
222 See, e.g., State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 792 (Minn. 1999); State v. Nelson, 338 P.2d
301, 306 (N.M. 1959); State v. Roseborough, 472 S.E.2d 763, 767 (N.C. 1996).
223 See supra Part II.D.1.
224 State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404, 417 (Nev. 1950).
225 See Payne v. State, 406 P.2d 922, 924 (Nev. 1965).
226 See id.
227 Although there may be, for example, evidentiary reasons for withholding such informa-
tion, nothing in the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion indicates any reason to infer that the
prosecution would have needed to omit certain material information related to the underlying
chain of events had they prosecuted the defendant for each crime separately.
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conduct arguably went above and beyond his self-defense argument.228  A rea-
sonably prudent person could consider the totality of the evidence and reasona-
bly infer that the purpose underlying the murder was to commit robbery.
Although the defendant may not have intended to kill his victim from the
outset, his actions mirrored those of an individual seeking to commit robbery,
willing to undertake fatal means if necessary in light of opposition by the vic-
tim, who would have used deadly force to resist such an attack if needed.229
The State sufficiently proved the elements of robbery and the homicide’s inti-
mate association with robbery.  To reiterate the res gestae approach, the tempo-
ral order of the killing and felonious act is immaterial when the offenses
constitute one continuous transaction or occurrence.230  In Nay, there was such
“continuity of evil action,” with the two offenses being “inextricably interwo-
ven”231 to justify imposing a conviction for felony murder upon the defendant.
The homicide was an emanation of the felonious act—the force or violence
used to commit robbery.232
3. The Minority View Does Not Circumvent the Purposes and
Rationales Underlying the Felony Murder Doctrine
Until now, this Note has focused primarily on legal references to both
precedent and persuasive case authority, analogizing to the facts and circum-
stances in the principal case.  However, looking at the felony murder doctrine
in light of its underlying purposes and rationales affords additional support for
the minority view.
As an initial observation, only those courts adopting or adhering to the
majority view supported their position by incorporating policy arguments.  By
contrast, those courts adopting or adhering to the minority view relied virtually
entirely on case and statutory law, presumptively finding little reason, if any, to
stray beyond the plain language of the statutes and the applicable use of the res
gestae approach.  The distinction suggests that, had the law vehemently
opposed application of the felony murder rule in the context of “afterthought”
robbery, the states’ legislative bodies would have taken the necessary steps to
proscribe any such application.
Every state choosing to dive into policy arguments opposed to the minor-
ity view focused, in large part, on deterrence and transferred intent.  However,
as discussed more fully below, other important rationales support the felony
murder doctrine.  In addition, the concepts of deterrence and transferred intent
may not be missing altogether when applying the felony murder rule in the
context of “afterthought” robbery.  The law on felony murder has embraced
228 Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 431 (Nev. 2007).  The court only makes passing reference to
Nay having raised a self-defense argument in the district court, leading the author of this
Note to infer that either the jury or the district court summarily dismissed this affirmative
defense or that the defendant failed to satisfy the elements necessary to prove self-defense.
229 See Crump & Crump, supra note 5, at 360 n.7 (“[A] man could resist a felon with
deadly force if necessary [at common law]; if a person is committing a crime for which he
can be lawfully killed, ‘the presumption is that the felon would kill if necessary and such
implied intent is sufficient to make it murder.’”) (internal citation omitted).
230 See, e.g., State v. Roseborough, 472 S.E.2d 763, 767 (N.C. 1996).
231 See, e.g., Haskell v. Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (Va. 1978).
232 See State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404, 416-17 (Nev. 1950).
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both expansion and limitation, as evidenced by a court’s willingness to convict
co-felons having little to no role in a homicide occurring during the perpetra-
tion of a felony (i.e., accomplice liability),233 though simultaneously adhering
to the “merger” rule234 and applying the doctrine exclusively toward enumer-
ated felonies the legislature previously deemed dangerous.235
It is an onerous burden on the State to prove or disprove a defendant’s
claim that he accidentally or unintentionally killed a person, and then decided
as an afterthought to rob his victim, particularly without any eyewitness testi-
mony.  In a robbery case where the two offenses constitute the same transaction
or occurrence, it would render a felony murder conviction practically impossi-
ble to sustain without permitting the State to rest its case on circumstantial
evidence to refute the defendant’s “afterthought” argument.236  The concern
with perjury and falsification is obviously present,237 particularly with an indi-
vidual who has either admitted to committing both the felonious act and the
homicide (though later claims they were separate and distinct offenses) or when
the State has sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that the defendant
committed both acts.  Additional concern rests with the defendant seeking to
lessen the prospective of punishment by alleging an “afterthought” defense
where the State may have little evidence to prove otherwise.
Society has long embraced the felony murder doctrine in accord with the
demand for “law and order.”238  The doctrine is designed to protect society
from those who present “unwarranted and unnecessary threats of death” in pur-
suance of criminal activity.239  The public does not want to sympathize with an
individual who willingly engages in activity conducive to the death of innocent
victims to accomplish a felonious act.240  Any individual who engages in
“afterthought” robbery removed the need to use force or violence to commit
robbery because he already committed a violent, deadly act immediately
beforehand.  There arguably is little injustice in holding a defendant criminally
liable to the fullest extent of the law for committing murder felony, given the
close and intimate connection between the two offenses and the culpability
underlying the overall occurrence.
Proportionality in sentencing is satisfied where felonious conduct accom-
panies a killing, even if occurring immediately thereafter, because the conduct,
in sum, is more culpable than each offense committed separately.241  A defen-
dant should not “be heard to say [that] his intentions were pure when he admin-
istered the blows which resulted in the death of [his] victim” (i.e., without the
underlying intent to rob the victim).242  The felonious conduct accompanying
233 See, e.g., Binder, Origins of Felony Murder, supra note 2, at 197-201.
234 See, e.g., Crump & Crump, supra note 5, at 377-82; Huster, supra note 4, at 749-50.
235 See, e.g., Binder, Origins of Felony Murder, supra note 2, at 187-91.
236 See Crump & Crump, supra note 5, at 389 (“[A] claim of accident, coupled with a claim
of ‘afterthought,’ is facile and difficult to disprove.”); see also People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d
252, 274 (Ill. 1992); State v. Nelson, 338 P.2d 301, 307 (N.M. 1959).
237 See Crump & Crump, supra note 5, at 375-76, 389.
238 Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 1461-63.
239 Id. at 1463.
240 See id. at 1472.
241 See Crump & Crump, supra note 5, at 389-90.
242 See State v. Craig, 514 P.2d 151, 155 (Wash. 1973).
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the homicide arguably supplies an additional justification for imposing a har-
sher penalty on the defendant.  Armed robbery already involves a significant
risk of death, even without prior contemplation,243 which suggests why it tends
to be included among the list of dangerous felonies enumerated by state legisla-
tures in statutes prescribing felony murder.  A robbery coupled with a homicide
occurring immediately beforehand, providing the foundation for engaging in
the robbery, seems to be more culpable than robbery without the victim’s death.
Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has limited, if not eliminated, any
outstanding concern with disproportionality in sentencing through receipt of the
death sentence in the context of “afterthought” robbery, thereby limiting the
maximum sentence a defendant may receive in this context absent other aggra-
vating circumstances.244
Another purpose of the felony murder doctrine is its value as a
“prosecutorial tool.”245  The doctrine imposes strict liability, offering an effi-
cient administration of justice, which optimizes judicial resources.246  Felony
murder provides relief to the prosecution from proving actual malice or pre-
meditation on the part of the defendant relative to the homicidal act.247  Imposi-
tion of felony murder in the context of “afterthought” robbery continues to
promote efficient prosecution of criminals when circumstantial evidence
implies that the homicide was part and parcel of the res gestate of the felonious
act, even if it was committed prior to the commission of the felony.  Moreover,
criminal law embraces the concept of res gestae when a killing occurs subse-
quent to the commission or completion of the felonious act.248  Simultaneously
applying the concept when the killing precedes the felonious act is arguably
consistent and results in judicial uniformity.  The minority view also eliminates
any confusion or undue waste of limited judicial resources arising from a
defendant introducing the defense of “afterthought” robbery, which again plays
into the concern with perjury and false allegations.249
It is important for society to acknowledge the inherent risks associated
with any particular conduct.  Support for the majority view could lead a felon
to inquire whether he would be convicted of felony murder if he kills his vic-
tim, followed sometime thereafter by committing a felonious act.  Rather,
applying the minority view assures society that a criminal who kills, then robs,
must suffer the same consequences otherwise imposed on a defendant who
robs, then kills.
As suggested earlier, the concept of deterrence remains in effect in the
context of “afterthought” robbery when the evidence leads to a reasonable
inference that the defendant committed homicide in the perpetration of the fel-
243 See Moesel, supra note 5, at 454.
244 See infra Part IV.B.
245 Donald Baier, Arizona Felony Murder:  Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 36 ARIZ. L.
REV. 701, 714 (1994).
246 See Crump & Crump, supra note 5, at 374-75.
247 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 49 (2006).
248 See, e.g., id. § 56; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 68 (2008); 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHAR-
TON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 150 (15th ed. 2007).
249 The author of this Note does not go so far as to opine, however, that confusion or undue
waste of limited judicial resources should govern a court’s decision to adopt either view,
given that a defendant’s life and liberty is at stake.
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ony.  The felony murder doctrine purposely deters the killing of the victim of
the felonious act once commission of the felonious act is underway.250  The
rule encourages a defendant to be careful when he commits a felony.251  Aimed
at discouraging violent or reckless behavior during commission of a felony, the
harsh results imposed through the doctrine seek to caution a defendant who
may otherwise kill to complete his felonious act.252  However, a defendant who
facilitates the commission of a felony by undertaking fatal means to accomplish
his goal will be deterred from completing the act if the felony murder doctrine
remains applicable in the context of “afterthought” robbery because the prose-
cution will have alternative means of prosecuting the defendant for murder.
The resulting punishment associated with first-degree murder is more readily
available upon conviction for felony murder, in light of the different steps
required in prosecuting a defendant for felony murder versus the traditional,
and more difficult, path required in prosecuting a defendant for first-degree
murder.253
To reiterate, the law wants to encourage carefulness by deterring danger-
ous conduct.254  It is difficult at best to determine (conclusively) whether a
defendant had the requisite intent to commit robbery at the time of a killing.
However, because the jury has the authority to make this determination, deter-
rence plays a role in situations where the evidence allows the jury to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant had the necessary intent, and therefore,
should have known of the consequences of his actions.
Finally, the notion of transferred intent remains intact to a certain extent,
though the timeframe when the intent first arose to commit the felony is inclu-
sive of that occurring immediately after the killing.  Although the prosecution
need not prove specific intent for a robbery charge in Nevada, the defendant
still forms intent at some point during the commission of the felonious act,
which can then be attributed back to the homicidal act.  Admittedly, this may
lessen the strength of the legal fiction behind the transferred intent rationale
necessary to prove that the defendant had a malicious intent to kill his victim at
the time he committed the felony.  However, absent a moment of complete
involuntary control over one’s own actions, such as acting in “a sudden heat of
passion” or “without due caution or circumspection,”255 an intent to do harm
arises during the overall occurrence.  Therefore, although the connection may
not be as simple and straightforward as in the generally understood context of
250 See Cole, supra note 2, at 21.
251 See Birdsong, supra note 2, at 2-3.
252 See Tomkovicz, supra note 1, at 1448-51.
253 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(a) (2007) (requiring the state to prove the killing was
“willful, deliberate and premeditated”).  The author of this Note is not proposing that the
State should easily be able to convict a defendant, who is otherwise innocent until proven
guilty, with first-degree murder.  However, until the Nevada Legislature eliminates the fel-
ony murder doctrine altogether, or clarifies the current ambiguity in the statute to account for
the context of murder felony, the State should have the right to prosecute a defendant for
felony murder, even if the burden is somewhat lighter than a prosecution for first-degree
murder in the traditional sense.
254 Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 434 (Nev. 2007).
255 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.040(2) (2007) (setting forth the statutory elements for man-
slaughter in Nevada).
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traditional felony murder, the defendant does emanate an unlawful intent dur-
ing the course of an “afterthought” robbery, satisfying the legal fiction of trans-
ferred intent.
In sum, the minority view still abides by many of the underlying purposes
and rationales behind the felony murder doctrine and does not overtly extend
the law to punish a person for conduct not otherwise attributable to his own
criminal behavior.  Ultimately, the State seeks to prosecute an individual with
blood on his hands, and affording dispositive weight to a defendant’s argument
that he committed a robbery only as an afterthought, completely unrelated to
the homicide, rather than affording due weight to the State’s presentation of
ample circumstantial evidence to indicate otherwise, unfavorably sides with the
criminal over the State.  The State is merely seeking justice on behalf of the
general public for the consequences of the criminal behavior of a particularly
culpable individual.
B. Choosing to Adopt the Minority View in Nevada Will Not Expose a
Defendant to the Death Sentence Absent Other Aggravating
Circumstances Other Than the Felonious Act
One particularly warranted fear of courts hesitating to adopt the minority
view is the resulting consequence that the decision may have on the type of
punishment a defendant may receive for a felony murder conviction in the con-
text of “afterthought” robbery.256  Although Nevada courts no longer conduct a
proportionality review of death sentences, but rather, review a death penalty for
excessiveness, “considering only the crime and the defendant at hand,”257
imposing the death penalty on a defendant in the context of murder felony
admittedly raises doubt as to whether adhering to the minority view will pre-
vent imposing excessive punishment on a defendant.  A defendant charged and
convicted of felony murder may not have had the requisite intent to commit
murder (in other words, only the intent to commit the underlying felony) which
otherwise justifies imposing the death sentence.258  However, as discussed
more fully below, the Nevada Supreme Court’s recent decision in McConnell v.
State259 eliminates any concern that adopting the minority view could result in
a defendant receiving a death sentence where a district court upholds a felony
murder conviction in the context of “afterthought” robbery.
Nevada Revised Statutes, section 200.030 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
A person convicted of murder of the first degree is guilty of a category A felony and
shall be punished:  (a) By death, only if one or more aggravating circumstances are
256 See, e.g., Metheny v. State, 755 A.2d 1088, 1110-20 (Md. 2000).
257 See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 13 P.3d 434, 440 (Nev. 2000); see also NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 177.055(2)(e) (2007) (mandating review of a death sentence for excessiveness by the
Nevada Supreme Court on appeal, even if the defendant waives the right to appeal).
258 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(a) (“Murder of the first degree is murder which
is . . . [p]erpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait or torture, or by any other kind of
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. . . .”) (emphasis added).
259 McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2004), reh’g denied, 107 P.3d 1287 (Nev.
2005).
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found and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances which are found do not out-
weigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances . . . .260
Section 200.033 of the Nevada Revised Statutes prescribes “the circum-
stances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated;”261 particularly
relevant is the following:
4.  The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others, in
the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting
to commit, any robbery . . . and the person charged:
(a)  Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or
(b)  Knew or had reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force
used.262
The State’s use of the predicate enumerated felony for conviction of fel-
ony murder as an aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty on the
defendant in a capital prosecution creates ample concern.  The United States
Supreme Court requires a constitutional capital sentencing scheme to “genu-
inely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder.”263  This requirement stems from the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps,264 where the sole
aggravating circumstance warranting the imposition of a death sentence on the
defendant was the same element used in convicting the defendant of capital
murder.265  Based on the ruling in Lowenfield, the Nevada Supreme Court
decided in McConnell that further narrowing of death eligibility was necessary
in light of the broad language of Nevada’s felony murder statute.266  Addition-
ally, the court found that the felony aggravator set forth in section 200.033(4)
of the Nevada Revised Statutes was insufficient to narrow death eligibility to
satisfy constitutional impositions mandated by the United States Supreme
Court.267  Therefore, the court held that, “in cases where the State bases a first-
degree murder conviction . . . on felony murder, to seek a death sentence the
State [has] to prove an aggravator other than one based on the felony murder’s
predicate felony.”268
In light of the decision in McConnell, a penalty imposing death on the
defendant in Nay would have been unlawful for the State to pursue, or the
district court to impose, absent other aggravating circumstances.  Although Nay
could have received life in prison,269 a life sentence is arguably proportional to
the severity of the crimes that he committed.  Regardless, death was not an
260 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4) (2007).
261 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (2007).
262 Id. § 200.033(4).
263 McConnell, 102 P.3d at 620-21 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983)).
264 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
265 See McConnell, 102 P.3d at 620 (discussing briefly how the Lowenfield decision “pro-
vide[d] the basic analytic framework [for the court] to approach [the] issue”).
266 Id. at 622.
267 See id. at 621-24.
268 Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
269 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(b) (2007).  As discussed in Part III.B, the district
court sentenced Nay to two consecutive life sentences for the felony murder conviction. See
supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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option, absent a showing of other aggravating circumstances270 not outweighed
by one or more mitigating circumstances271 as may have been presented by the
State at Nay’s sentencing hearing.272
Although the limit on imposing the death penalty on a defendant convicted
of first-degree murder in the context of “afterthought” robbery may not be
available in other states,273 the Nevada Supreme Court should not consider
similar arguments submitted on this issue after its ruling in McConnell.  There-
fore, the minority view may find additional support before the Court because
the State may not pursue, and a district court may not impose, a death sentence
on a defendant convicted of felony murder in the context of “afterthought”
robbery based solely on circumstantial evidence, where the jury found that the
homicide was part of the res gestae of the felonious act.  Rather, the State must
present to the jury other aggravating circumstances that outweigh any mitigat-
ing circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
The facts and circumstances underlying the principal case are questionable
at best.  Although the author of this Note does not propose to have a better
perspective on the matter than the justices of the Nevada Supreme Court who
took the case en banc, he does question the heavy degree of reliance and defer-
ence afforded to the defendant’s confession and “afterthought” defense.
Although the presumption of “innocent until proven guilty” is vital to our sys-
tem of criminal justice,274 a reasonably prudent person may doubt that the
defendant in Nay v. State only formed the intent to rob his victim after the
killing.  The lack of any eyewitnesses to attest to the crimes committed, the
multitude of incriminating statements voiced by the defendant afterward, and
the jury’s disbelief in the defendant’s “afterthought” defense substantiates,
rather than diminishes, the likelihood that the defendant had the intent to rob on
or around the time he killed his victim.  As discussed at length in this Note, the
res gestae approach encompasses circumstances that give rise to murder felony
where the two crimes are so intimately associated and interrelated as to be part
and parcel of the same overall criminal episode, and state courts adopting the
minority view properly recognize the criminal culpability of a defendant who
cries “afterthought” to charges for felony murder.  The majority view simply
falls short.
Given the current interstate conflict over support for the majority and
minority views, it will be interesting to observe how other state courts adjudi-
cate cases involving murder felony in general, and “afterthought” robbery in
270 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (2007).
271 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.035 (2007).
272 See § 200.030(4)(a).
273 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 19-21, 25-26, 52-55 (fearing that a conviction based on
afterthought robbery in Ohio will result in a death sentence through committing aggravated
murder while committing an enumerated felony under the requisite statute, thus destroying
the narrowing requirement and the limiting principles of the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution).
274 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.191 (2007) (“A defendant in a criminal action is pre-
sumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved . . . .”).
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particular (both for those courts that have yet to visit the issue, and for those
courts that revisit the issue in future opinions).  In the meantime, the judiciary
should not impede the State’s authority to prosecute a defendant to the fullest
extent permitted by law.  Until the Nevada Legislature amends the felony mur-
der statute and specifically requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant
intended to commit a predicate enumerated felony prior to or concurrent with
committing a homicide,275 the State should be allowed to charge a defendant
with, and seek a conviction for, felony murder when the circumstances indicate
that the homicide occurred prior to the felonious act.  The aftermath of the Nay
decision adds a new burden on the State when prosecuting a defendant for
felony murder in the context of “afterthought” robbery not founded in state
precedent or the statutes proscribing robbery and murder.  The author of this
Note hopes the Nevada Supreme Court will take notice of the viable substan-
tive legal arguments and corresponding social policy reasons for following the
minority view, and reconsider its holding in Nay (particularly when coupled
with the implications of the McConnell decision).  Whether a defendant com-
mits felony murder or murder felony, the result should be the same.
275 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(b) (2008) (“No culpable mental state is
required for conviction under subdivision (a)(2) [(the felony murder provision)] . . . except
the intent to commit the enumerated offenses or acts in [that] subdivision[ ].”) (emphasis
added).
